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"INVIDIOUS" AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY: MORTON V. MANCARI CONTRA
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC., V. PENA, RICE V.
CAYETANO, AND OTHER RECENT CASES
Frank Shockey*
Introduction
To import generic equal protection theories ... into federal
Indian law constitutes an error of significant magnitude, for it
confuses a puzzling, conceptually intractable, and little-understood
corner of public law with its mainstream'
Professor Philip Frickey, among other commentators, has expressed
concern about the continuing viability of Morton v. Mancari" as a recon-
ciliation of the body of federal law concerning American Indians3 with the
equal protection ideals exposited in Brown v. Board of Education and
applied to the federal government in Bolling v. Sharpe.
*Ph.D. student, Department of Geography, University of Minnesota; M.A. (Geography), 2001,
University of Minnesota; B.A. (Geographical Studies), 1999, University of Chicago. The author
thanks Rod Squires and Bruce Braun for their comments on early drafts of this article. The author
particularly thanks David Wilkins for his advice and guidance.
1. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1754, 1764-65 (1997).
2. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
3. Major issues in the situation this article will treat are the legal meaning of "Indian" and
the criteria by which the federal government determines if individuals and groups are Indian. By
"American Indian" I refer to indigenous people both of the forty-eight contiguous states, and of
Alaska, although the Inuit and Aleut peoples am not ordinarily subsumed under that term.
"Alaska Native" refers to indigenous people of Alaska specifically, but for the purposes of this
article, distinguishing Alaska Natives from indigenous people of the forty-eight contiguous states
is unimportant; therefore I shall use "American Indian" to refer indigenous people of both Alaska
and the forty-eight contiguous states, and use "Alaska Native" only when that distinction is
relevant. The apparent distinction between "Native Hawaiians," or the indigenous people of
Hawaii, and those of the forty-nine continental states is eminently relevant to the purpose of this
article, however, so I shall refer to that group of people specifically by that term here. The term
"Native American," which is possibly more politically correct, does not necessarily exclude
Native Hawaiians in the same fashion as "American Indian" does. I therefore use "Native
American" only to refer to all the indigenous peoples of the United States, including Hawaii. The
federal government usually refers to American Indians simply as "Indians," probably because that
is the term used in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3. Alaska Natives have since been incorporated within the purview of both the term
"Indian" and "American Indian" for most federal purposes. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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One unfamiliar with the evolution of federal American Indian policy might
see little overt connection between tribal sovereignty and the destruction of
racially discriminatory and later also of racially preferential policies across the
levels of American government. Indeed, an uninformed onlooker, conditioned
by the anti-racist sentiments prevailing today, could not but expect that the
destruction of policies making racial distinctions would liberate American
Indians from the same legally sanctioned oppression that the government has
visited on other minorities in the past. The holding of Mancari indicated that
the relationship of American Indians to the federal government was political,
not racial. If Mancari were a perfect harmonization of federal Indian law with
equal protection, it would protect all federal programs for American Indians
from attacks claiming that Indians are singled out as a race for special
treatment. Suits attacking federal programs targeted specifically at Indians for
using racial criteria - particularly in employment preference situations -
have nonetheless been pursued since Mancari was decided in 1974.6
American Indian people have undeniably benefitted from the varied
remedial civil rights legislation enacted since the early 1960s, including the
affirmative action programs that the Supreme Court disapproved in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke and Adarand Constructors, Inc., v.
Pena.8 Such benefits accrued solely from American Indians' status as
members of one of the minority ethnic and racial groups that the affirmative
action programs named as beneficiaries, and not from their membership in
sovereign tribal entities which the Supreme Court has famously called
"domestic dependent nation[s]."9 The conclusion that all legislation enacted
for the benefit of American Indians is congruent to affirmative action
legislation, and therefore unconstitutional for violating the right of equal
protection,"0 is simply erroneous.
The troublesome fact remains that the federal government legally has
defined and continues to define who is Indian according to racial as well as
political criteria. Morton v. Mancari has served to protect federal programs
singling out American Indians from equal protection challenges in the quarter
6. E.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing as contrary to the
plain language of the statute a challenge to the Reindeer Act of 1937, 25 U.S.C. §§ 500-50On
(1994), as categorically prohibiting non-Natives from owning reindeer in Alaska).
7. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (restricting the use of racial criteria in state policy).
8. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (restricting the use of racial criteria in federal policy).
9. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
10. Professor Frickey has pointed out that guarantee of equal protection under the law found
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution applies, by its wording, only to the states and
not the federal government, and that its extension to the federal government through interpretation
of the fifth amendment is a "product of the judges' mind[s]." Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and
Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1754,
1759 (1997). The origin of an equal protection guarantee applicable to federal policies is
unimportant to the purpose of this article; what is important is that the Supreme Court has ruled
that there is such a guarantee, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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century since its decision largely by downplaying the racial component and
emphasizing the political component of the federal government's relationship
with American Indians and the tribes they compose. That solution has become
increasingly unstable since the intensification of the scrutiny under which
federal policies utilizing racial criteria must be placed following the decision
in Adarand. Mancari's failure to acknowledge the racial component of the
federal relationship to Indians may prove to be its undoing.
The Adarand holding, and Justice John Paul Stevens's lengthy dissent, have
been particularly dangerous to the stability of Mancari as precedent due to
their composite interpretation as questioning Mancari in subsequent cases.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently denied a challenge to a law
creating obstacles to non-Native reindeer ownership in the interest of Alaska
Natives in the case of Williams v. Babbitt," but in the process the court of
appeals made some potentially damaging remarks in dicta concerning the
effects of Adarand on Mancari. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Justice
Stevens's Adarand dissent is particularly misleading, and may provide
ammunition for a later court to view Adarand as weakening, or even over-
ruling, Mancari, as the plaintiffs in Williams argued. 2 Justice Stevens's
dissent in a case decided in early 2000, Rice v. Cayetano,"3 by arguing that
Mancari acknowledged the racial aspects of the federal relationship to
American Indians, could lend further support to the Ninth Circuit's alarming
claims. 4
The rationalization of the use of racial and political criteria in federal
Indian policy found in Mancari is at a crossroads; recent cases have both
ambiguously supported and attacked that case's principles. This article
evaluates the present situation by analyzing the court decisions and pieces of
legal scholarship that have conditioned it, and by delving into the legal history
of the federal government's relationship to American Indians.
I divide the body of this paper into three parts. Part I investigates the legal
origins of political and racial conceptualizations of American Indians, and the
use of those conceptualizations as bases for aspects of the federal relationship
to Indians rather than merely for employment preferences. Part II examines
the Mancari case, comparing it to its progenitor, Simmons v. Eagle Seelat-
see.5 Part III considers subsequent cases and commentaries that have
influenced the current status of Mancari, with particular attention to possible
interpretations of recent cases, including Adarand, Williams, and Rice. I
11. 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997); see supra note 7.
12. Williams, 115 F.3d at 663.
13. 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000).
14. "If Justice Stevens is right about the logical implications of Adarand [in his dissent in
that case], Mancari's days are numbered." Williams, 115 F.3d at 665.
15. 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
No. 2]
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conclude with prognostication concerning future outcomes of this currently
uncertain situation.
L Race, Sovereignty, and the Relationship of the Federal Government
to American Indians
The concepts of race and sovereignty are deeply imbedded in the
relationship of American Indian people to the governments of the United
States. The federal government, having established itself as the sole authority
in the United States authorized to deal with tribes and their members, 6 has
throughout its history alternately constructed American Indians as a race of
human beings, and as an amalgamation of political sovereigns incidentally
composed of members of that race, to widely different effects. The United
States Supreme Court has usually been the most eloquent interpreter of the
laws of the United States, but in the area of law concerning Indians,
Congress's enactment of contradictory policies or simple ignorance of Indian
issues has also often forced the Court to make, rather than interpret, policy.
Congress particularly disregarded tribes in the early nineteenth century, 7
requiring the Court to arbitrate with little statutory direction such legal matters
as arose concerning Indians. I will examine in this section the Court's use of
racial and political constructions of American Indians in three of the most
important foundational cases determining the relationship of Indians to the
United States: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," United States v. Rogers,9 and
Worcester v. Georgia.2'
The only explicit mention of American Indians in the original Constitution
is in the enumeration of the powers of Congress, in a clause known as the
Commerce Clause: "[The Congress shall have power] to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."'" The portion of the Constitution that conferred treaty-making power
on the President,' and the portion that named treaties as "the supreme law
16. The federal government is the sole supreme authority that may deal with tribes under the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832). State, county, municipal, or other non-federal regulation of tribes may arise only
by the specific authorization Congress. Several western states have been so authorized with
regard to some areas of law by a 1953 Act of Congress known commonly as Public Law 280.
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.
17. See generally I INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 1-22 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1904). A cursory glance at the compilation of the revised statutes relating to Indians as of the end
of the nineteenth century indicates that an overwhelming majority of them were enacted in the
second two-thirds of the century.
18. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
19. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
22. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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of the land,"' have both been interpreted as applying to American Indian
tribes. The fourteenth amendment excludes "Indians not taxed" from the
apportionment of representatives. The authority to make treaties and to
regulate commerce was insufficient power to resolve disputes involving
Indians and still permit continued westward expansion across the continent.
Confronted with little Constitutional direction and Congress's inaction, the
Supreme Court was compelled to fabricate a relationship between the United
States and tribes. Two early cases, Fletcher v. Pece and Johnson v.
M'Intosh, characterized the property rights of Indians as legally different
from that held by Euro-Americans. Indian (or "aboriginal") title is generally
communal or originated in communal possession, and permits the holder only
the right of occupancy." These cases held that aboriginal title could not be
bought or sold except by the colonizing European sovereign or the Euro-
American State created from the colony. Indians could not sell their land to
anyone - aboriginal title could only be extinguished by force of arms or by
cession through treaty. This doctrine is known as the doctrine of discovery.
The wordings of the Court's opinions in these cases have since been used to
justify dispossession of large tracts of land without compensation. The
fabricated concept of aboriginal title is a racially, or at least geographically,
dependent concept; no European nation seriously contended that the citizens
of another European nation held their lands under a different, and less secure,
form of title than did its own citizens. Chief Justice John Marshall's invention
of aboriginal title was an important first step toward embracing the doctrine
of discovery and other racial legal constructions of American Indians.
A. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
The racial and political aspects of American Indians' relationship to the
United States became particularly germane a few years after Johnson, in the
early 1830s. The State of Georgia passed in late 1829
an act to add the territory lying within the chartered limits of the
State of Georgia, now in the occupancy of the Cherokee Indians,
to the counties of Carroll, De Kalb, Gwinett, Hall, and Haber-
sham, and to extend the laws of this state over the same, and to
23. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
24. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
25. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
26. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
27. A conflicting definition of aboriginal title arose in Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 711 (1835). In Mitchel, aboriginal title was considered to be as "sacred as fee-simple." Later
courts frequently chose to use the "mere" possessory rights definition rather than the "sacred"
possessory rights definition, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 273 (1955).
No. 2]
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annul all laws and ordinances made by the Cherokee nation of
Indians ... and to regulate the testimony of IndiansO
The Cherokee Nation brought a bill to the Supreme Court on its original
jurisdiction, asking for an injunction to prohibit the State of Georgia and its
officers from enforcing its laws on the Cherokee Nation. The bill argued that
those laws violated the treaties between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation, and thereby, the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted a hearing
in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, as it involved as parties a State
of the Union and a nation of indeterminate sovereign status. The State of
Georgia did not send any representatives to appear before the Court."
Georgia refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the federal government at
the time, as did several other southern states. The nullification conflict, and
the question of whether other branches of the federal government could be
made to conform to Supreme Court holdings, placed pressure on the Court,
and particularly on its Chief Justice.
Chief Justice John Marshall is probably the single most important
individual in the formative development of the relationship of American
Indians to the United States. Marshall delivered the opinions of the Court in
the Fletcher, Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester cases, among others.
In 1830, Marshall was acutely aware that the state of Georgia, and President
Andrew Jackson, would not abide by his decision if he found that the
Cherokee Nation was an independent, foreign nation like, for example, France
or the United Kingdom." He was also aware of the ramifications of the
decision for the possibility of continued westward colonization. Marshall was
not entirely unsympathetic, however, to the Cherokee Nation's situation:
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better
calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people
once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our
ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample
domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts
and our arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each
of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they
retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed
necessary to their comfortable subsistence. To preserve this
remnant, the present application is made.3'
28. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831).
29. JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES 100 (1996).
30. See, e.g., id. at 102, 105, 109.
31. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
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Marshall's task in Cherokee Nation was to rationalize the various recognitions
of the Cherokee Nation's sovereignty with the purpose and method of
American colonialism, or to postpone the issue. He did a little of both.
Marshall disposed of his momentous task in a few short paragraphs - the
two concurring opinions and the dissenting opinion compose the largest
volume of the case report. Marshall noted in considering the question of the
Court's jurisdiction that the acts of the federal government had clearly
recognized the Cherokee Nation as a state of some sort. The wording of the
applicable section of the Constitution, concerning judicial powers, extends the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "controversies between a state or the
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects," and confers original
jurisdiction on the Court in cases in which a state is a party.32 The Cherokee
Nation was not a state of the union, and its attorneys did not argue that it was,
but that it was a foreign nation. Marshall persistently referred to the tribe as
an aggregate of members - rather than "the Cherokee Nation," he used "the
Cherokees"; rather than "it," he used "they." He wrote, for example,
paraphrasing the argument of the Cherokee Nation's attorneys: "they are not
a state of the union, and have insisted that individually they are aliens, not
owing allegiance to the United States. An aggregate of aliens composing a
state must, they say, be a foreign state. Each individual being foreign, the
whole must be foreign.""
Marshall created a new sovereign status within the U.S. political system to
refute the Cherokee Nation's claim that it was a foreign nation, and thereby
permit continued colonization. The five sentences he used to do so continue
to color the relationship of American Indians to the United States even today:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable,
and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until
that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our
government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they
are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.'
Marshall induced from the quasi-subordinate status of some tribes that had
then been subsumed within the external boundaries of the United States the
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-2.
33. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
No. 2]
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more universal principle "that the framers of our constitution had not the
Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the union to controver-
sies between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states."" The
difference between the nineteenth century political relationship of the United
States to the tribes of the western portion of the continent, or to the Kingdom
of Hawaii, and, for example, to the Empire of Japan, resulted almost entirely
from differences in geographic location and racial constitution. The facile
basis for this difference has since been largely forgotten?6 Other nations
would pooh-pooh the suggestion that the United States Congress has or ever
had "plenary power" to legislate with regard to the affairs of Japanese, or the
affairs of any other nation's citizens. Victory in World War H gave the United
States a great influence over the rewritten Japanese Constitution, but the
United States did not absorb Japan as a state, or as a trust territory. What
distinguished American Indian nations, or the Hawaiian Kingdom, from the
defeated empire of Japan? Geographical location? The Kingdom of Hawaii
shared more similarities to Japan in that regard than it did American Indian
nations. Was the distinction based on the race of the inhabitants? Perhaps, but
the inhabitants of all three were of different races than the ruling elite of the
United States. One could also argue that the historical period in which the
United States obtained hegemony over Japan was different from that in which
the United States dispossessed most tribes and annexed Hawaii. Each of these
explanations provides a portion of the necessary contemporary justification for
the United States's actions, but none of them justify the refusal to act on the
knowledge that the federal power over American Indians, and the annexation
of Hawaii, are and were opportunistic contrivances.
Marshall laid bare the racial nature of this distinction between the
sovereignty of Indian nations and that of the states, the federal government,
and foreign nations, in an attempt to bolster his argument:
In considering this subject, the habits and usages of the Indians,
in their intercourse with their white neighbours, ought not to be
entirely disregarded. At the time the constitution was framed, the
idea of appealing to an American court of justice for an assertion
of right or redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the mind
of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk,
or to the government. . . . [The peculiar relations between the
United States and the Indians occupying our territory are such,
35. Id. at 18.
36. Norgren has nonetheless commented that creating the appellation "domestic dependent
nation" was little more than a "transparent ploy" that allowed Marshall "to avoid further attacks
on the powers of the Court from Jackson and states' rights forces." Norgren, supra note 30, at
109. The disposition of successive cases has supported this viewpoint only occasionally.
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that we should feel much difficulty in considering them as
designated by the term foreign state.37
Throughout his arguments regarding the lack of foreignness of tribal nations,
Marshall characterized their relationship to the United States as "peculiar" and
"unlike that of any other two peoples in existence" and referred to "peculiar
and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else." The only explanation for
the evolution of this peculiar and unequal relationship in this opinion is
Marshall's generalization about the dependent nature of Indians" and their
"habits and usages . . . in their intercourse with their white neighbours."39
Why, indeed, would the citizens of a foreign nation consider appealing to an
American court of justice for a "wrong" committed in their own country? To
appeal to "the government" diplomatically, or to threaten war, as between
nations, would much more exemplify the behavior of a "foreign nation."
Marshall's argument only makes sense if the domesticity of the Cherokee
Nation is assumed.
At the present time, the foreign nations of Luxembourg, Monaco, and San
Marino, for example, are small, lack military power, and are surrounded by
and dependent upon much larger and more powerful nations. What distin-
guished such small nations from American Indian tribes? Each was founded
by essentially tribal groups of Europeans in the Dark Ages or Middle Ages.
Luxembourg and Monaco were long dominated by their stronger neighbor
nations, and San Marino was long protected by the Roman Catholic Church.
All three nations' sovereignty was recognized again in the midst of the wars
of the nineteenth century. None of the dominant countries argued (at least not
to any effect) that the smaller countries were peculiarly dependent on them,
although they were, and still are, clearly quite dependent on their larger
neighbors. American Indian tribes were in America, the New World, not
Europe, the Old World. Their lands and their populations were subject to
discovery, conquest, and colonization by whatever European sovereign could
arrive first. Marshall had written in considerable detail about the doctrines of
discovery and conquest and applied them to American law in Fletcher and
Johnson. Now Marshall stressed that it was the "habits and usages of the
Indians, in their intercourse with their white neighbors"' that set them apart
37. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
38. Marshall expanded further on the dependency of Indians:
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power,
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves,
as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States,
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them,
would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
Id. at 17-18.
39. Id at 18.
40. Id.
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from Europeans and Euro-Americans. The relative level of civilization -
"civilization" defined, of course, by Europeans - became the standard by
which to distinguish a band of aboriginal people, whose rights could be
disregarded, from a bona fide foreign nation. The Court accordingly found
that the Cherokee Nation, not being a state of the union or a foreign nation,
had no standing with which to bring a case to the Supreme Court on original
jurisdiction. The Cherokee Nation decision defined the political sovereignty
of tribes in a racial fashion, foreshadowing a case decided fifteen years later:
United States v. Rogers.4'
B. Race-Based American Indian Law Becomes Clear: United States v.
Rogers
Fifteen years later the Supreme Court decided a case concerning the
membership of tribes. In United States v. Rogers, the Court was called on to
decide if non-Indians could become members of a tribe, in this case the
Cherokee Nation. The answer to such a question could have been left to the
Cherokee Nation to determine; however, this possibility was neglected
because the Cherokee Nation was not even involved in the proceedings. The
Court instead awarded itself the power to determine the citizenship of tribes,
and accordingly decided the case.
Rogers, a "white" man, was indicted for the murder of Jacob Nicholson,
another "white" man, in a part of Indian country (present-day Oklahoma)
belonging to the Cherokee Nation. When brought before the Arkansas District
Court, which claimed jurisdiction over that portion of Indian country, Rogers
claimed that he had joined the Cherokee Nation, married a Cherokee woman,
and was therefore a Cherokee Indian. He argued that Nicholson was also a
Cherokee Indian for the same reasons. As such, Cherokee Indians in Indian
country were exempt from the laws of the United States pursuant to the Trade
and Intercourse Act of 1834.42 The district court refused to decide the case,
sending it to the Supreme Court by certificate of division on six questions,
most of which the Supreme Court refused to answer, finding them irrelevant.
Chief Justice Roger Taney, well known for delivering the opinion of the
Court in the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, delivered a similarly
race-based opinion in Rogers twelve years before. Taney took only a few
pages to explain why Rogers simply could not possibly be a Cherokee,
making some politically damaging remarks in the process. Two particular
sections of Taney's opinion make clear the racial character of the relationship
of American Indians to the United States that Marshall avoided discussing
directly in Cherokee Nation. The first discusses the racial basis for the
guardian-ward relationship:
41. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
42. Id. at 572.
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It would be useless at this day to inquire whether the [doctrine of
discovery] is just or not; or to speak of the manner in which the
power claimed was in many instances exercised. It is due to the
United States, however, to say, that while they have maintained
the doctrines upon this subject which had been previously
established by other nations, and insisted upon the same powers
and dominion within their territory, yet, from the very moment
the general government came into existence to this time, it has
exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit of
humanity and justice, and has endeavoured by every means in its
power to enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and
to save them if possible from the consequences of their own
vices. But had it been otherwise, and were the right and the
propriety of exercising this power now open to question, yet it is
a question for the law-making and political department of the
government, and not for the judicial.43
Taney found Rogers's claim that he became an Indian through adoption
preposterous, and accordingly interpreted the exception in the Trade and
Intercourse Act as applicable only to a pseudo-scientifically defined race of
Indians:
[W]e think it very clear, that a white man who at a mature age is
adopted into an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian,
and was not intended to be embraced by the exception above
mentioned. He may by such adoption become entitled to certain
privileges in the tribe, and make himself amenable to their laws
and usages. Yet he is not an Indian; and the exception is confined
to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians are
regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of members
of a tribe, but of the race generally, - of the family of Indians;
and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their own tribe,
and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and
customs. And it would perhaps be found difficult to preserve
peace among them, if white men of every description might at
pleasure settle among them, and, by procuring an adoption by one
of the tribes, throw off all responsibility to the laws of the United
States, and claim to be treated by the government and its officers
as if they were Indians born. It can hardly be supposed that
Congress intended to grant such exemptions, especially to men of
that class who are most likely to become Indians by adoption, and
43. Id.
No. 2]
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who will generally be found the most mischievous and dangerous
inhabitants of the Indian country."
Taney saw American Indians in this case as a physically defined race.
Although Taney claimed that the exception applied to "those who by the
usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race,"
the Court neglected to determine whether Rogers was regarded by the "usages
and customs" of the Cherokee Nation as "belonging to their race." Earlier in
the opinion Taney denied that tribes had any sovereignty the United States
was bound to respect: "The native tribes who were found on this continent at
the time of its discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations by the European governments, nor regarded as the owners
of the territories they respectively occupied."' The Court held that Rogers
was clearly not an Indian, and remanded the case to the district court for trial.
Rogers has never been overruled and continues to be cited, though rarely."
Most importantly, Rogers approved the use of racial criteria in determining
tribal membership, and implicitly, in other matters relating to Indians.
Subsequent cases expanded that approval luxuriantly
C. The Court Affirms Sovereignty Over Racial Dependency: Worcester v.
Georgia
Chief Justice Marshall indicated in a passage from the Cherokee Nation
case that he was not unsympathetic to the Cherokee Nation's political
44. Id. at 572-73.
45. Id. at 572.
46. E/g. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (citing Rogers to help justify
divesting a tribe of its jurisdiction over non-Indians on its reservation).
47. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1926) ("Although sedentary,
industrious and disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs and domestic government,
always have lived in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people, ill-prepared to
cope with the intelligence and greed of other races. It therefore is difficult to believe that
Congress in 1851 was not intending to protect them, but only the nomadic and savage Indians
then living in New Mexico."); Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1900) ("We are
more concerned in this case with the meaning of the words 'tribe' and 'band.' By a 'tribe' we
understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one
leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory; by
a 'band,' a company of Indians not necessarily, though often of the same race or tribe, but united
under the same leadership in a common design."); Westmoreland v. United States, 155 U.S. 545,
548 (1895) (upholding Rogers in the face of the plain language of a treaty); Taylor v. Brown, 147
U.S. 640, 646 (1893) (referring to "transactions with members of a race of people treated as in
a state of pupilage and entitled to special protection") (citing Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U.S. 310
(1892). and Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 330 (1892)); id. at 330 ("Whatever may have been
the injustice visited upon this unfortunate race of people by their white neighbors, this court has
repeatedly held them to be the wards of the nation, entitled to a special protection in its courts,
and as persons 'in a state of pupilage.' Congress, too, has recognized their dependent condition,
and their hopeless inability to withstand the wiles or cope with the power of the superior race.").
[Vol. 25
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/10
"INVIDIOUS" TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
situation, and not unmindful of their sovereignty Cherokee Nation has had
disastrous results for American Indian tribal sovereignty, and United States v.
Rogers is a member of the line of cases beginning with Johnson v. M'Intosh
or perhaps Fletcher v. Peck, and including Cherokee Nation, which denied
aspects of the sovereignty of tribes on racial grounds. Fortunately, these cases
do not define American Indian law altogether. Other members of the Court
who had deferred to the opinion of the Chief Justice in Cherokee Nation were
willing to join Marshall in rebuking Georgia for usurping the authority of the
federal government to act with regard to tribes in a case decided less than a
year later. This case, Worcester v. Georgia," has been the cornerstone upon
which subsequent cases upholding tribes' sovereignty have been built.
Georgia passed an act in late 1830 prohibiting white people from living in
the areas within its boundaries that were occupied by the Cherokee Nation.
Worcester, a white Christian missionary from Vermont, went to the Cherokee
Nation with its approval and in order to preach there. Worcester was
apprehended, tried in county court, and sentenced to four years of hard labor
for residing in that area in contravention of state law. Worcester's attorneys,
who had argued the Cherokee Nation case the year before, brought the case
to the Supreme Court on writ of error to the Superior Court for Gwinnett
County. The Supreme Court found that the case, involving much the same
issue as Cherokee Nation, had this time been properly brought before it.
The Court was therefore forced to consider the question of whether states
could pass laws governing tribes and their lands. Marshall first acknowledged
that "the very passage of [the act prohibiting whites from residing in the
Cherokee Nation] is an assertion ofjurisdiction over the Cherokee nation, and
of the rights and powers consequent on jurisdiction."0 Now Marshall made
a rather surprising statement, after his articulation of the doctrine of discovery
in Johnson and his creation of "domestic dependent nations" in Cherokee
Nation:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited
by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of
each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their
own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult
to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either
quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of
dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they
occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give
48. See supra note 32.
49. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
50. Id. at 542.
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the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the
preexisting rights of its ancient possessors.5'
Just to make sure that no one suspected he had been bamboozled into
submission by Georgia's recalcitrance and President Jackson's open hostility
to the Court, Marshall added further denigration of the doctrine of discovery:
"The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the east
coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate
power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did
not enter the mind of any man."' Discovery, argued Marshall, provided a
government only with the right to purchase lands from and treat with Indians
exclusive of other European nations, and conferred no jurisdiction or other
regulatory power.
Marshall accordingly began to analyze the language of the treaty of
Hopewell between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, a treaty
between two sovereign nations that had been at war. After a long and detailed
analysis, Marshall concluded that the treaty explicitly recognized the national
character of the Cherokees, and their right to self-government. Cogently com-
bining the analysis of the treaty with the explanation of the doctrine of
discovery, Marshall stated,
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of
the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which
those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on
the Indians.53
Marshall noted additionally that the state of Georgia itself long had held a
similar view - that American Indians had full rights to their lands and
government of them - and pointed out that "[Georgia's] new series of laws,
manifesting her abandonment of these opinions, appears to have commenced
in December 1828. ' 54
Having presented all his arguments, Marshall concluded that the Cherokee
Nation was indeed quite sovereign (albeit with certain limitations under the
doctrine of discovery), and the State of Georgia had no authority in Cherokee
country:
51. Id. at 542-43.
52. Id. at 544-45.
53. Id. at 559.
54. Id. at 560.
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The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States
and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States."
The Court sent a special mandate to the superior court of Gwinnett county,
ordering it to reverse its decision and release Worcester. President Jackson
and the state of Georgia subsequently conspired to remove the Cherokees to
Oklahoma by force on the infamous "trail of tears," notwithstanding the
Court's recognition of Cherokee sovereignty. Although the Worcester case
failed to protect the Cherokees from forced removal, it has been upheld
repeatedly as the strongest single legal recognition of the sovereignty of tribes.
I. Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, Morton v. Mancari, and the Attempt
to Harmonize Equal Protection with Federal American Indian Policy
Worcester v. Georgia upheld the sovereignty of tribes by focusing on the
political position of tribes as outside U.S. politics and their acknowledgement
as independent political entities.' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and United
States v. Rogers denied the sovereignty of tribes by focusing on a view of
their members' racial positions as non-European and uncivilized.' Judicial
disapproval of racial criteria in federal Indian law seemingly should be the
most important step in recognizing the political sovereignty of American
Indian tribes, then. Racial criteria are so ingrained in the relationship of the
federal government to Indians, though, that attempting to extricate them from
federal Indian law has the opposite effect, unless a full-scale acknowledgment
of the sovereignty of all tribes, a return of all judicial, legislative, and
executive powers, and a return of all lands illegally ceded, taken by force, or
otherwise wrested from tribes in bad faith, accompanies that repudiation of
racial criteria. Rather than go so far in returning tribes' sovereignty to them,
or so far in terminating tribes altogether, the Supreme Court has tried to take
a moderate approach to reducing the use of racial criteria, by arguing that the
primary relation of the United States to Indians is political, and racial criteria
are auxiliary, at best. Racial criteria are important to the federal government's
method of determining tribal membership, and to the administration of the
trust relationship. The partially conflicting views, that racial criteria are
essential to the federal relationship to Indians, and that racial criteria are a
55. It. at 561.
56. See supra Part I.C.
57. See supra Parts I.A., I.B.
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minor part of the federal government's mostly political relationship to Indians,
were articulated by two cases that arose in the later part of the civil rights era:
Morton v. Mancari58 and Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee
The Court's argument in Morton v. Mancari against viewing American
Indian preferences as racial discrimination relies on the unique historical
construction of American Indian tribes in the U.S. legal system. Legislation
with regard to Indians has long been considered a constitutionally and
judicially approved activity. The tenor of the Court's arguments in Mancari
indicate a recognition that over the years since Cherokee Nation and
Worcester, federal laws had become more important in protecting American
Indian sovereignty from state and local governments and their constituents,
than in restraining Indians from exercising the power of the "tomahawk," to
which Chief Justice Marshall had referred,' in defense of their sovereignty.
Protection from state and individual interference, and varied social services
and other benefits, were now provided to tribes and individual Indians in
recognition both of historical inequities perpetrated by the United States and
its citizens, and of the continuing sovereign status of tribes. Ruling special
benefits and protection for Indians illegal under equal protection laws would
be effectively the same as declaring assimilation complete and terminating the
sovereign status of tribes:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA,
single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians
living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from
historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only
Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire
Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the
Indians would be jeopardized.6'
Historical discourses would be largely pointless if the Court were to rule that
determination of who is an "Indian" for the purposes of the trust relationship
is a purely racial matter.
Rather than attempt to prove that American Indians as groups and as a
whole, for federal purposes, are constructed solely as political entities and not
as a racial group, the Court indicated that it would be sufficient to show that
American Indians were constructed at least partly as something other than a
racial group. If the demonstration that race is only one of a number of factors
determining group membership is sufficient to justify the federal government's
58. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
59. 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965), alfd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
60. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I, 18 (1831).
61. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
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various forms of "special treatment" for that group, then the Court clearly
made a proper use of policy history in Mancari and in subsequent cases. To
ask the Court to decide that for federal purposes American Indian tribes, and
American Indians, are solely political entities, would be to ask the impossible,
for they clearly are not and have not been, either historically or legally. To
so rule, the Court would have to strike down the portions of the Indian
Reorganization Act that uphold the authority of Congress and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to use racial criteria in determining the membership of
tribes and the eligibility of individuals for services.' The Court in Mancari
did not set out to make such a drastic revision of the other two branches'
policies - rather, it seems to have built on a 1965 federal district court
decision, Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee,' to decide tacitly that race could be
a factor in the determination of eligible groups, so long as it were not the only
one. Simmons was the forebear of Mancari; its arguments concerning the
legal use of race with regard to Indians were not taken up in Mancari, but its
acknowledgement that racial criteria were essential to the federal relationship
to Indians was important, though used carefully and quietly by the Court. The
Court cited Simmons as the judicial support for its concern that "every piece
of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations" might be "deemed
invidious racial discrimination."" This concern, as we will see, stemmed
from Simmons's explicit recognition of the necessity of racial criteria in many
areas of the federal relationship to Indians. The Court was careful in Mancari,
however, not to acknowledge directly the widespread presence of racial
criteria in federal Indian law in the way that Simmons did.
A. Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee and a Pragmatic Argument for the Use of
Racial Criteria in the Federal Relationship to Indians
The district court was confronted in Simmons with a challenge to the use
of racial criteria in determining the eligibility of individuals to inherit allotted
lands from deceased Indian relatives. The specific criterion in this case, a
blood quantum requirement, was found in section 7 of a 1946 act regarding
the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation'
exclusively.' The blood quantum requirement excluded those relatives of
members, who were not also enrolled members with one quarter or more
Yakima blood, from inheriting any allotted lands.
Joseph Simmons, Sr., was a member of the Yakima Nation who had
received an allotment and continued to hold it at the time of his death. After
62. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
63. 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
64. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552-53.
65. Now known as the "Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation."
66. Act of Aug. 9, 1946, § 7, ch. 933, 60 Stat. 968, 969 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 607
(1994)).
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his death, the Secretary of the Interior denied Simmons's heirs the right to
inherit his allotment because none of them met the blood quantum re-
quirement of section 7. Simmons's heirs challenged the act, claiming that it
was unconstitutional because it failed to provide Yakima Indians with due
process of law in that it bore "no reasonable relation to the guardianship the
United States has of Indians," and because it violated the Fifth Amendment,
under Bolling v. Sharpe.'
The district court's argument concerning the merits of the Simmons case
centered, as one might expect, on Congress's authority to determine tribal
membership. Also as one might expect, the district court premised that
argument with the plenary power of Congress to legislate on Indian matters."
The Constitutional authority from which Congress derives its "plenary" power
over Indians is by no means clear; however, several long-standing and often-
quoted cases in the Supreme Court have upheld that power. The case of
United States v. Kagama69 is usually identified as the judicial decision
allowing Congress plenary power over Indians:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government,
because it has never existed anywhere else, because the theatre of
its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes."M
The district court did not cite Kagama as the source of Congress's plenary
power;" rather it considered the matter settled and cited more recent cases
that both acknowledged Congress's plenary power and included the power to
determine tribal membership within that plenary power.
The district court used those cases to move from invoking the general
power of Congress over Indians to supporting its key proposition - that the
determination and regulation of tribal membership was a necessary aspect of
Congress's plenary power, and section 7 of the 1946 act was nothing more
than an exercise of that power. The primary justification for this proposition
came from two Supreme Court cases: Stephens v. Cherokee Nation' and
67. Simmons, 244 F. Supp. at 810-11.
68. Id. at 813.
69. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
70. Id. at 384-85.
71. The term "plenary" was first used in this fashion in Cherokee Nation v. United States,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 44 (Baldwin, J., concurring), but such a power, in the sense that "plenary"
means "absolute" was not viewed as residing in Congress until Kagama.
72. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
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Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.' The Stephens case concerned the
constitutionality of Congress's delegation of the power to determine tribal
membership to the Dawes Commission74 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock
concerned the constitutionality of Congress's authorization of lease sales to
subsurface rights on Cherokee lands by the Secretary of the Interior.5 Both
cases held that the determination of tribal membership was a necessary
component of Congress's power over Indians.
The district court saw no reason to view the use of a blood quantum
requirement in the 1946 Act as racially discriminatory. Whether that
requirement was discriminatory or not, courts have not been inclined to
overrule congressional actions with regard to Indians, as the district court
noted. 6 In any case, the district court was not compelled to confront
Congress; it cited Tiger v. Western Investment Co. and several other cases7
to support its position that "it seems obvious that whenever Congress deals
with Indians and defines what constitutes Indians or members of Indian tribes,
it must necessarily do so by reference to Indian blood." The cited cases
provided further evidence that Congress had frequently used blood quantum
to place some Indians in one group and some Indians in another group, to
delineate different entitlements and rights.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the district court's position was its
conclusion to the line of argument concerning Congress's powers over tribal
membership:
It is plain that Congress, on numerous occasions, has deemed it
expedient, and within its powers, to classify Indians according to
their percentages of Indian blood. Indeed, if legislation is to deal
with Indians at all, the very reference to them implies the use of
"a criterion of race". Indians can only be defined by their race"
73. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
74. The district court cited the following passage:
We repeat that in view of the paramount authority of Congress over the Indian
tribes, and of the duties imposed on the Government by their condition of
dependency, we cannot say that Congress could not empower the Dawes
Commission to determine, in the manner provided, who were entitled to
citizenship in each of the tribes and make out correct rolls of such citizens, an
essential preliminary to effective action in promotion of the best interests of the
tribes.
Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 813 n.10 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affd, 384 U.S. 209
(1966) (citing Stephens, 174 U.S. at 488).
75. The district court cited Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock in accord with Stephens, as
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock decided a similar issue, making use of the Stephens holding and
quoting it approvingly. Id.
76. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962)).
77. Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of
Detroit, 234 U.S. 245 (1914); United States v. Ferguson, 247 U.S. 175 (1918).
78. Simmons, 244 F. Supp. at 814 (emphasis added).
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In support of the contention that Indians can only be defined by their race, or,
at least, that that method of definition is so ubiquitous in federal Indian law
that no alternative exists but to perpetuate it, the district court constructed a
brief argument in a related footnote.79 If the use of a criterion of race were
unconstitutional, every statute relating to Indians would be unconstitutional.
In that case, the property held in trust for Joseph Simmons Sr. would have
been allotted to him unconstitutionally, and his heirs would have no right to
inherit it because Simmons's interest in the trust property would be nullified
by the unconstitutionality of the trust relationship itself. This argument,
although effective in this case, would be impossible to make in the case of
Morton v. Mancari as it involved non-Indian employees of the BIA.
Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee acknowledged the presence of racial criteria
in federal Indian laws in a way that Morton v. Mancari avoided. The
Supreme Court's holding in Mancari contained much more detail, but was
worded much more ambiguously. Portions of the opinion of the Court in that
case grate quite harshly against the final pronouncement of the district court
in Simmons:
We hold that there was a rational basis for the classification
provided in § 7. Necessarily continued intermarriage with white
persons would ultimately produce persons who were in no true
sense Indians. At some reasonable point a line must be drawn
between Indians and non-Indians, between those properly to be
regarded as continuing members of the tribe, and those who are
not. Th[is] case has no resemblance to Bolling v. Sharpe, where
the segregation of pupils, by race, in public schools was held a
violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
As an explanation of the position of American Indian policy in opposition to
equal protection, Simmons succeeds much better logically than Mancari, but
Mancari has been the controlling precedent. Mancari did, as we shall see,
acknowledge Simmons and its reasoning, but shied away from its open
acceptance of racial criteria.
B. Morton v. Mancari and the Denial of Racial Criteria
Non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action suit against Secretary
of the Interior Rogers Morton claiming that the longstanding BIA preference
system for Indian employees violated several sections of the newly enacted
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA),8' and the Fifth
Amendment. The district court found that the EEOA had implicitly repealed
that preference, which originated in the nineteenth century and was codified
79. Id. at 814 n.13.
80. d. at 815 (citations omitted).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el (1994).
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by the Indian Reorganization Act.' On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Congress did not intend to repeal the preference with the EEOA
(and noting that "repeals by implication are not favored"'), and that the
preference did not violate the Fifth Amendment under Boiling v. Sharpe. The
issue of whether or not Congress intended to repeal the preference with the
EEOA is mostly irrelevant here, so I will focus on the Court's holding that the
preference did not violate the Fifth Amendment. The reasoning the Court
provided for so holding differed markedly from the reasoning it approved of
in affirming the Simmons decision.
As we have seen, the district court in Simmons was not bashful about
acknowledging the racial aspect of the law determining the Simmons heirs'
eligibility to inherit Simmons's allotment. The Court in Mancari noted the
unique legal and political status of Indians as tribe members, acknowledging
the development of congressional plenary power and a guardian-ward
relationship. All this the district court had done in Simmons; but the Couit in
Mancari refused to admit that the BIA preference contained a racial criterion.
Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the unanimous Court, explained the
Court's view of the preference as lacking a racial quality:
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this preference
does not constitute "racial discrimination." Indeed, it is not even
a "racial" preference. Rather, it is an employment criterion
reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-
government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of
its constituent groups."
The first two sentences of this quote are important to understanding how
Blackmun viewed the argument he was making. The second sentence, by
adding the claim that the BIA preference is not a racial preference to the first
sentence's claim that the preference is not racial discrimination, makes a
distinction between racial preferences and racial discrimination. The Court,
by so wording its holding, obviously contemplated that there could be racial
preferences that were not racially discriminatory, although it argued that this
particular preference was neither. Although the Court denied that the BIA
preference was a racial preference, it neither explicitly denied nor proscribed
the inclusion of a racial criterion as a component of the process for deter-
mining the membership of tribes as eligible political groups.
Blackmun further explained the Court's position in a related footnote:
The preference is not directed toward a "racial" group consisting
of "Indians"; instead, it applies only to members of "federally
82. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1994).
83. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974).
84. Id. at 553-54.
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recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who
are racially to be classified as "Indians." In this sense, the
preference is political rather than racial in nature .... An Indian
has preference in appointment in the Bureau. To be eligible for
preference in appointment, promotion, and training, an individual
must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member
of a Federally-recognized tribe.'5
Blackmun argues in this footnote that the preference does not benefit a racial
group (Indians), but rather benefits members of certain political groups
(tribes), essentially all of whom also happen to be members of that racial
group. The preference thus excludes many members of the racial group who
are not members of any of the eligible political groups, as Blackmun correctly
notes in justification of the differentiation of Indians as a racial group from
tribes as political groups. The Court did not address the question of whether
the exclusion of members of tribes who are not Indians (should there be such
individuals) from the preference would be impermissible. To decide that the
BIA preference could not exclude members of tribes who were not racially
Indian, the Court would have to overturn, or somehow distinguish, cases (such
as United States v. Rogers) in which non-Indians adopted into Tribes were
held to still be non-Indians for legal purposes. In doing so the Court would
risk unstitching the already flimsy patchwork of legal processes by which
American Indian tribal membership is determined.
The Court was faced in Mancari with a difficult problem: if it held that the
preference was racial and thereby violated the Fifth Amendment, then it
would necessarily also disapprove the criteria for determining tribal member-
ship and the status of individuals as "Indian" in broader terms. Such a
decision would overturn Rogers and open the way for non-Indians to join
tribes virtually at will, thereby destroying any remnant of a nation-to-nation
relationship between tribes and the federal government, and making the trust
relationship impossible to administer, if not simply illegal. That decision
would also be a momentous intrusion into areas in which the Court has
traditionally deferred to congressional action. The Court's other option was to
explain, as it did, why American Indian tribes have a special relationship with
the federal government that other minority groups do not, and why the policy
making up that relationship has never been subjected to the same
Constitutional scrutiny as other policy. The Court had not yet made inroads
into declaring the recognition of racial distinctions, of all types and for all
purposes, illegal. Even a few years later in the landmark degradation of
affirmative action policies, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,"
85. Id. at 554 n.24.
86. See supra Part I.B.
87. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the Court carefully noted that it did not proscribe race as a selection criterion
per se, but only as the sole selection criterion. The BIA preference in
Mancari clearly does not use race as the sole criterion. More recently, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,S Mancari was not so clearly distin-
guished, and, most alarmingly, was implicated in the holding by one of the
dissenters.
III. Interpretations of Mancari and Its Relationship
to Equal Protection Rights
The Supreme Court generally has used Mancari in three ways: (1) in
majority opinions, to define the limits of implicit repeals; (2) to justify special
federal programs and special legal status for American Indians; and (3) in
dissenting opinions and briefs in cases reforming affirmative action programs,
to argue that different types of racial preferences are permissible. No Supreme
Court case has explicitly questioned Mancari; rather, use of the case in
dissenting opinions has associated it with some cases that struck down
preference programs. This association in Adarand9 led the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals to suggest in Williams v. Babbitt' that Mancari might be
have been modified, or be in danger of reversal. Justices Stevens's use of
Mancari in his dissenting opinion to an even more recent case, Rice v.
Cayetano,9" although upholding the case as good precedent, seems to
unwittingly support the Ninth Circuit Court's argument by its method. The
Court distinguished Mancari in the past from the Bakke' case, which struck
down a certain type of racial preference. The present situation, involving
Adarand, Williams, and Rice, is more complicated and much more contem-
porarily problematic than that past situation, so I will concentrate more
analysis on the present. Mancari is in urgent need of re-explanation, to affirm
its stability, or of replacement with a more stable harmonization of equal
protection with federal Indian policy. Absent one of those solutions, a
differently comprised Court may choose to interpret Adarand in the way that
the Ninth Circuit suggested in Williams and the dissent in Rice unintentionally
supported.
The Court's use of Mancari in the case of Fisher v. District Couri? only
two years after Mancari was decided exemplifies the way the Court
commonly has used the case in other cases involving American Indians.
Fisher was a per curiam decision concerning the jurisdiction of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe over adoption proceedings in which all concerned, parties
88. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
89. Md
90. 115 F.3d 657 (1997).
91. 120 S. CL 1044 (2000).
92. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
93. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
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were Tribe members. In holding that the Tribal Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over such proceedings, the Court stated:
We reject the argument that denying [plaintiff] access to the
Montana courts constitutes impermissible racial discrimination.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive
from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign
status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.
Moreover, even if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in
denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has
access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because
it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-555 (1974)."
The Court thus used Mancari to justify what appeared superficially to be
racial discrimination against individual Indians, in much the same way as it
had used and would continue to use Mancari to justify what appeared to be
discrimination against non-Indians by way of preference for Indians. Fisher
entrenched the Mancari concept of the primacy of a tribe's political sovereign
status over the racial categorization of the Indians that compose it. The Court
used Mancari in this way for several years after Fisher," but in the past few
years it has used other language from its opinion in Mancari to support
Congress' plenary power over tribes.
The other more common use of Mancari by the Court has been as a
keystone of a canon of statutory construction: "repeals by implication are not
favored."'  This canon has several other cases behind it, but the regularity
at which the Court has cited Mancari as one of its important bases in a wide
variety of cases9S suggests that the Court considers Mancari a stable
94. Id. at 390-91 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974)).
95. E.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463 (1976); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Washington v. Washington State Comml Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980).
96. Eg., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163 (1989); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak &
Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
97. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 549 (citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936), Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342-43, 363 (1842), and Universal Interpretive
Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968)).
98. E.g., The Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Administrator, FAA
v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976); St. Martin
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. Soliino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991);
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
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precedent and an important articulation of the strong scrutiny to which ar-
guments concerning implicit repeals must be subjected.
The first major endangerment of Mancari I identify was in the 1978
landmark affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke," on certiorari to the California Supreme Court. Allan Bakke, a white
applicant to the University of California, Davis, medical school, applied and
was rejected in two consecutive years, while less-qualified minority students
were admitted under a special program that reserved sixteen of the one
hundred spaces in the entering class for minority students. The Supreme
Court of California held the special admissions program unlawful and
declared that race could not be considered in the admissions process. Five
members of the United States Supreme Court agreed with the California
Supreme Court that the medical school's special admission program was
unlawful, upholding that part of the California court's decision, but five
members agreed that the medical school could not be prohibited from
considering race in its admissions process, reversing that part of the California
court's decision. Justice Lewis Powell announced the decision of the Court
and delivered an opinion, joined in each of two parts by a different four of the
other eight members of the Court. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun concurred with the decision that race could be considered in the
admissions process but dissented in arguing that the special admission
program was not unlawful. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun also
wrote separate opinions to emphasize their own positions. Justices Stevens,
Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger concurred with the decision that
the special admission program was unlawful but argued that the California
Supreme Court's holding that race could not be considered in the admission
process should be upheld as well.
The Bakke decision resulted in a serious curtailment of generalized
attempts to achieve equal opportunity for all races by way of affirmative
action programs. This curtailment included affirmative action directed toward
American Indians, but only those programs that were directed toward
American Indians solely as a racial minority group, in the same sense that
African-Americans or Chicanos compose minority groups. The opinion of the
Court, given by Justice Powell, was the only opinion in Bakke to mention
Mancari, concisely distinguishing it from the situation at hand. It stated:
Petitioner also cites our decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535 (1974), for the proposition that the State may prefer members
of traditionally disadvantaged groups. In Mancari, we approved a
hiring preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs .... We observed in that case, however, that the legal
status of the BIA is sui generis. Id., at 554. Indeed, we found that
99. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the preference was not racial at all, but "an employment criterion
reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government
and to make the BIA more responsive to.. groups... whose
lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique
fashion.""°
The only mention of Mancari in the Bakke decision, then, was to distinguish
it from Bakke and clarify the fact that the attorneys for the University of
California misinterpreted Mancari in attempting to use it to support their case
arguing that the special admissions program was legal. The Court avoided
leaving the status of Mancari in question after Bakke by distinguishing it in
the quoted footnote. None of the dissenters tried to use Mancari to support
their arguments in favor of the special admissions program. Three years later,
in Watt v. Alaska, the Court used Mancari again to explain the canon of
construction disfavoring repeals by implication. 1 Justice Stewart dissented
from the decision of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Marshall. Stewart devoted some argument to distinguishing the holding of
Mancari from the fact situation in Watt, explaining part of Mancari in the
process." z The use of Mancari as good law by both the majority and the
dissent in Watt indicates that the Court considered the precedent established
in Mancari to be untouched by Bakke.
Justice Stevens's use of Mancari in his dissent to the 1995 case of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena could create a serious problem, if some future
Court should seize upon the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court's interpretation of it
in Williams v. Babbitt.3 The Adarand case, like Bakke, did not involve
tribes' relationship to the federal government, or Indians at all, except as one
group among the various groups targeted by the affirmative action program
at issue. Adarand Constructors, Inc., was a highway construction company
owned by a white person, and lost a federal contract because of a program
favoring subcontracting companies owned by "socially or economically
disadvantaged individuals." The Court overruled Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, ° holding that "strict scrutiny" must be applied to federal programs
involving racial classifications, even if "benign" in nature. The case was
remanded to the lower courts with instruction to apply strict scrutiny to the
fact situation under established precedent. Justice O'Connor delivered the
opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, and in "pertinent" part by Justice Scalia. Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in three separate opinions, the most lengthy
and detailed by Justice Stevens and joined in by Justice Ginsburg. Justice
100. Id. at 304 n.42.
101. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981).
102. Id. at 281.
103. 115 F.3d 657 (1997).
104. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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Stevens took issue with the Court's concepts of "skepticism," "consistency,"
and "congruence," and with the Court's application of the principle of stare
decisis. Stevens's argument against the Court's concept of consistency
implicated Mancari, though, I argue, not in exactly the sense the Ninth Circuit
claimed in Williams.
The programs struck down by both Adarand and Bakke considered
American Indians as a race for affirmative action purposes, not as the
constituents of quasi-sovereign political entities. The comparison between the
affirmative action issue in Bakke and Adarand, and the sovereignty and trust
relationship issues of Mancari, should ideally end here. The opinion of the
Court in Adarand did not even mention Mancari. Justice Stevens used
Mancari, however, in the midst of his argument that the Court's concept of
consistency in equal protection law would undermine efforts to secure equality
for disadvantaged minorities. Concerning "consistency," Justice Stevens's
dissent stated, "The Court's concept of 'consistency' assumes that there is no
significant difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special
burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by the majority to
provide a benefit to certain members of a minority notwithstanding its
incidental burden on some members of the majority."'" Stevens argued that
"benign" programs, designed to "eradicate racial subordination" deserve
different treatment from that accorded "invidious programs" designed to
"perpetuate a caste system."
In illustration of the difference between benign and invidious programs,
Stevens constructed a hypothetical situation involving the World War H-era
discrimination against Japanese-Americans. Curfews, exclusion from certain
areas, and confinement in camps imposed on the members of a minority
defined by racial and ethnic characteristics were surely invidious
discrimination, as the Court had opined."° At this point in the argument
Stevens began to philosophize:
Suppose Congress decided to reward [Japanese-American
soldiers'] service with a federal program that gave all Japanese-
American veterans an extraordinary preference in Government
employment. If Congress had done so, the same racial charac-
teristics that motivated the discriminatory burdens in Hirabayashi
and Korematsu would have defined the preferred class of
veterans. Nevertheless, "consistency" surely would not require us
to describe the incidental burden on everyone else in the country
as "odious" or "invidious" as those terms were used in those
105. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Ud at 244 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (both of which, however, surprisingly held the invidious
policies lawful, as they were for "national security" purposes)).
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cases. We should reject a concept of "consistency" that would
view the special preferences that the National Government has
provided to Native Americans since 1834 as comparable to the
official discrimination against African Americans that was
prevalent for much of our history. t"
The final sentence of this quote included a footnote associating Mancari with
the argument, and briefly attempting to relate the situation in Mancari to the
situation in Adarand:
To be eligible for the preference in 1974, an individual had to "be
one fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a
Federally-recognized tribe." We concluded that the classification
was not "racial" because it did not encompass all Native
Americans. In upholding it, we relied in part on the plenary
power of Congress to legislate on behalf of Indian tribes. In this
case respondents rely, in part, on the fact that not all members of
the preferred minority groups are eligible for the preference, and
on the special power to legislate on behalf of minorities granted
to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
Stevens followed the hypothetical argument about Japanese-Americans and the
sentence about American Indians with a few more examples to undermine the
Court's concept of consistency. He claimed that the Court's concept of
consistency "would treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote against
Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep African Americans off the
Supreme Court as on a par with Presidents Johnson's evaluation of his
nominee's race as a positive factor."" 9 The short citation of Mancari
appeared in the middle of a series of philosophical arguments aimed at
undermining a concept employed by the Court in reaching the Adarand
decision.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seized on that single sentence from
Justice Stevens's dissent two years later in Williams v. Babbitt."' Williams
wanted to import reindeer from Canada and herd them in Alaska, but was
unsure whether the Reindeer Act of 1937.. prohibited him from doing so.
Officials of the BIA at various local and regional levels informed Williams
that his plans would not violate the Reindeer Act, but Native Alaskan herders
pressed the issue until it reached the Department of Interior Board of Indian
Appeals (IBIA), which decided to the contrary. The IBIA held that even
though the Reindeer Act does not mention non-native ownership of reindeer,
107. d. at 244-45.
108. Id. at 244 n.3.
109. Id. at 245.
110. !15 F.3d 657 (1997).
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 500-500n (1994).
[Vol. 25302
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/10
"INVIDIOUS" TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
it must be construed to prohibit non-native entry into the Alaskan reindeer
industry, a holding that the federal district court upheld. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that Congress intended to "place significant
obstacles in the way of any non-native who would operate a reindeer business
in Alaska" but that the Reindeer Act does not expressly forbid non-natives
from entering into the reindeer business if they can overcome those obstacles.
In deciding that the IBIA's interpretation was simply contrary to the plain
language of the statute, the court of appeals mused about several other issues,
including the affect of Adarand on Mancari. Judge Brunetti grumbled in his
concurring opinion that the court should have dispensed with its lengthy
debate on the construction of the Reindeer Act:
Nothing in the Reindeer Act requires that we "construe" the Act
at all. Because the IBIA's interpretation of the Act, and the
district court's upholding of that interpretation, were contrary to
the plain language of the Act, there is no need to address "the far
more complex question" of "to what extent is a court bound to
defer to an agency's interpretation where that interpretation raises
difficult constitutional questions?""' 2
Judge Kozinski, writing for the court, nonetheless considered the merits of
deferring to the IBIA's interpretation and of ruling that the IBIA's
interpretation violated the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Kozinski was perhaps prodded to consider Mancari because Williams claimed
that Mancari was overruled by Adarand. Kozinski's comments on the
situation at first seem to distinguish Mancari: "the IBIA's interpretation makes
the Reindeer Act very different from a lot of other legislation pertaining to
Native Americans. The government, intervenors and amici have been unable
to cite another law that gives natives so broad a preference.""..3 Things
quickly turned ugly for Mancari, however:
Although the majority [in Adarand] emphasized that it was only
overruling Metro Broadcasting, Justice Stevens in dissent argued
that the majority's "concept of 'consistency' [in equal protection
jurisprudence] . . . would view the special preferences that the
National Government has provided to Native Americans since
1834 as comparable to the official discrimination against African
Americans that was prevalent for much of our history." If Justice
Stevens is right about the logical implications of Adarand,
Mancari's days are numbered."4
112. Williams, 115 F.3d at 668 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
113. Id at 664.
114. Id at 665.
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Taken in context, as we saw, supra, Justice Stevens was referring not to "the
logical implications of Adarand" but to the unconsidered implications of the
concept of consistency that the majority chose to apply in that case. Stevens
no more intended to imply that the Court was intentionally threatening
Mancari than he meant to imply that the Court was officially disapproving the
historic nomination of the recently retired Justice Marshall. Whether or not
the Court would choose to apply such a concept of consistency in a case
questioning the power of Congress to determine tribal membership using
racial criteria is quite another matter."5 This quotation from the Williams
opinion may seem to be a serious questioning of Mancari, but Kozinski had
a penchant for ambivalence. In a later footnote, he wrote:
Intervenors claim that subjecting laws favoring Indians to strict
scrutiny "would effectively gut Title 25 of the U.S. Code." Such
a dire prediction, however, is unwarranted. We have little doubt
that the government has compelling interests when it comes to
dealing with Indians. In fact, Mancari's lenient standard may
reflect the Court's instinct that most laws favoring Indians serve
compelling interests. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
115. Concerning the recent case of Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000), Robert J.
Deichert has argued that the Court was correct in striking down the OHA voting restriction
because the Fifteenth Amendment is "a complete bar to government[-]sponsored racial
discrimination with respect to the right to vote." Robert J. Deichert, Rice v. Cayetano: The
Fifteenth Amendment at a Crossroads, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1075, I 119 n.302 (2000). Deichert ap-
parently did not recognize that he also argued implicitly against the continued existence of
American Indian tribes as distinct polities: most recognized tribes hold elections under the Indian
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994). The IRA defines "Indian" as "all persons of Indian
descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the
present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-
half or more Indian blood." 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994). Another section of the code provides the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs (with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior) to manage all
Indian affairs, 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). This section of the code was interpreted in United States
ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80 (1907), as providing the Commissioner with the authority
to determine tribal membership. Determination of tribal membership frequently includes a blood
quantum requirement, e.g., Qualifications for Enrollment and the Deadline for Filing Application
Forms Rule, 25 C.F.R. § 61.4 (1999). Under these terms, it appears that tribal elections differ
little from the OHA election except in that they are mandated by the IRA rather than by the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. Assuredly, American Indian tribes often have existing
governmental structures that Native Hawaiians have not been permitted, but that distinction is
relevant only to the question of the existence of a trust relationship with Native Hawaiians, a
question that Mr. Deichert answered in the affirmative and the Rice Court left unclear. The alter-
natives seem to be that there is an exception to the Fifteenth Amendment, or that non-Indians are
being illegally discriminated against in being kept from voting in tribal elections. The Court
appears to have recognized that the "quasi-sovereign" status of tribes excepts them from the
Fifteenth Amendment, but the distinction the Court made between Native Hawaiians and Indians,
and between the OHA and tribal governments, Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1058-59, is in my view
immaterial.
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Law 656 ("The Courts reliance on a political-racial distinction
may be no more than an imprecise reference to the special status
of Indian tribes under the Constitution and laws."). If so, Title 25
will only be stripped of those laws that are not narrowly
tailored."
6
Did Kozinski intend to question Mancari or not? The statement about
Mancars days being numbered surely implies a level of uncertainty
concerning the precedent's stability, but considered in the context of the
footnote, the statement appears more to be an expression of uncertainty
concerning the endurance of the precise principles of Mancari. Kozinski
seems more likely to have been suggesting that the Court might more
satisfactorily reformulate Mancarrs harmonization of equal protection with
federal American Indian policy, or that strict scrutiny was not to be applied
to racial criteria used in federal Indian policy. The Ninth Circuit partially
recanted Kozinski's questioning statements in its decision of Rice v.
Cayetano,"7 but they remain in the record for later courts to interpret, and
the Supreme Court's distinguishing and use in dissent of Mancari in its recent
decision of Rice"' can be read either to support or weaken the questionable
status of Mancari.
Rice involved a restriction of voting rights to Native Hawaiians for a
special board to administer trust funds. The majority distinguished Mancari
from Rice by arguing that the elections for Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA)
trustees were State elections rather than elections for a separate quasi-
sovereign, and therefore were subject to the Fifteenth Amendment protection
against discrimination in voting, and not to the Mancari exceptions. Justice
Stevens dissented, joined in part by Justice Ginsburg, arguing that the federal
government had a trust relationship to Native Hawaiians and the OHA was a
legitimate program under power delegated to the State of Hawaii by Congress.
Justice Stevens accordingly used Mancari to support the argument that
Hawaii, as the representative of the federal government in the trust relation-
ship with Native Hawaiians, could establish a board to oversee the use of trust
funds for Native Hawaiians, whose composition would be decided by Native
Hawaiians. Justice Stevens argued:
116. Williams, 115 F.3d at 666 n.8.
117. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Although we questioned Mancari's continuing vitality in the light of Adarand in
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663 (9th Cir. 1997), and Rice believes Adarand
trumps both [Mancari and its Ninth Circuit associate, Alaska Chapter, Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982)], we are bound by
Supreme Court authority and our own precedent until overruled which neither
Mancari nor Pierce has been.
Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1081 n.17 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 120 S. Ct.
1044 (emphasis added).
118. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000).
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Membership in a tribe, the majority suggests, rather than member-
ship in a race or class of descendants, has been the sine qua non
of governmental power in the realm of Indian law; Mancari itself,
the majority contends, makes this proposition clear. But as
scholars have often pointed out, tribal membership cannot be seen
as the decisive factor in this Court's opinion upholding the BIA
preferences in Mancari; the hiring preference at issue in that case
not only extended to non-tribal member Indians, it also required
for eligibility that ethnic Native Americans possess a certain
quantum of Indian blood. Indeed, the Federal Government simply
has not been limited in its special dealings with the native peoples
to laws affecting tribes or tribal Indians alone. In light of this
precedent, it is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native
Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to restore
a measure of native self-governance because they currently lack
any vestigial native government - a possibility of which history
and the actions of this nation have deprived them. 9
Justice Stevens thus argues cogently that although Mancari made the
political aspect of Indians' relationships with the government paramount, the
case did not prohibit all consideration of race as a defining aspect of Indians'
political relationships with the government. Other sections of Justice Stevens's
opinion confirm this interpretation: "this Court has never understood laws
relating to indigenous peoples simply as legal classifications defined by race.
Even where, unlike here, blood quantum requirements are express, this Court
has repeatedly acknowledged that an overlapping political interest
predominates."'" Even though the voting qualification had a racial re-
quirement, its function was rooted in the political empowerment of indigenous
people: "any 'racial' aspect of the voting qualification here is eclipsed by the
political significance of membership in a once-sovereign indigenous class."''
Justice Stevens makes compelling arguments for the recognition of a
federal trust relationship with Native Hawaiians, delegated to the State of
Hawaii, and for the upholding of the OHA election restrictions. Others have
argued for'" and against" the recognition of a trust relationship with
Native Hawaiians; presenting such an argument is not the purpose of this
work. My concern is that Justice Stevens's willingness to recognize that
Mancari was not exactly what the Court claimed it to be - that the federal
119. Id. at 1066 n.ll.
120. Id. at 1068 n.12.
121. Id. at 1070 n.14.
122. John M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 95 (1998).
123. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of
Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE LJ. 537 (1996).
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government uses race as well as political status to define and relate to
American Indians - may unfortunately work to the advantage of those who
wish to interpret Adarand as implicitly overruling Mancari. Circuit Judge
Kozinski's cryptic, opposed comments on Mancari and Adarand leave
Adarands effects uncertain, with the way open for the Court to interpret
Adarand as weakening or overruling Mancari. Some recent lower federal
court cases seem to follow Mancari, but others seem to interpret Adarand as
altering the principles set forth in Mancari.
The recent case of United States v. Keys"U exemplifies the way in which
some lower courts have continued to follow Mancari and its progeny in spite
of the so-called "logical implications" of Adarand. Nathaniel Earl Keys, an
African-American, had a daughter ("Jane Doe") with an enrolled member of
the Colorado River Indian Tribe. Jane Doe's mother was listed as having one-
half Indian blood in her enrollment certificate. About two years later the
mother, who lived apart from Keys, discovered evidence that Keys had abused
the child. Keys was convicted of assault on Jane Doe, "an Indian," by a
federal magistrate. The judge noted that Jane Doe had one-quarter Colorado
River Indian blood, but was not an enrolled member. Keys appealed, claiming
that the Federal Enclaves Act,"~ under which he was convicted, was un-
constitutional because his conviction was based on the race of the child. The
district court upheld the magistrate judge's finding that the distinction between
Indians and non-Indians for the purposes of the Federal Enclaves Act was
political and not racial, and affirmed Keys's conviction.
Keys appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that his
daughter was not an Indian because she was not enrolled, and if enrollment
was not required for one to be Indian then his prosecution in federal court
violated equal protection. The court of appeals rejected Keys's argument,
pointing out that "enrollment is not the only means to establish membership
in a trib[e]."' Jane Doe's membership, said the court, was based not on her
race but on her institutional recognition by the Tribe, such as by the Tribe's
child welfare workers, as a member. In this case the court saw that Jane Doe
satisfied the blood quantum requirement for tribal enrollment, but was not
enrolled because she was too young to make such a decision. Following
Mancari (though citing United States v. Antelope"n), the court held that Jane
Doe's Indian status was due to the Tribe's recognition of her as a member, not
her race, in spite of the blood quantum requirement. The decision of the case,
should Jane Doe have had one-eighth Indian blood instead of one-quarter (and
therefore been racially unqualified for membership in the Tribe), may have
been a much more complex process.
124. 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
126. Keys, 103 F.3d at 761.
127. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
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A case decided by the District Court for the District of Columbia a few
months after the Supreme Court's Rice decision, American Federation of
Government Employees v. United States,"2 involved a situation analogous
to that in Adarand except that the preference at issue specifically applied to
American Indian-owned businesses. A group of unions and individual union
members sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Air Force from hiring
an American Indian-owned contractor, under a policy of preferential treatment
for firms owned by Indians, to do some civil engineering and maintenance
work at bases in New Mexico and Florida. Since the district court was only
explaining its decision to dismiss the application for a preliminary injunction,
the court did not actually decide the issue of whether the Air Force's
preference violated equal protection. The court did rule that it did not find
"substantial likelihood" that the unions' challenge to the preference would
succeed based on its merits. In so arguing, the court found that it was "likely
to conclude that the . . . preference is subject to strict scrutiny because it
burdens a fundamental right."" & In an associated footnote the court noted
that its
interpretation of Mancari could play a large role in determining
whether [it] finds the ... preference to be a racial classification
or a political classification. In turn, this categorization of the
preference would determine the level of scrutiny the court applies
to the preference. Specifically, if the court found the preference
is racial, it would apply strict scrutiny; if the court found the
preference is political, it would apply rational-basis review."
In the same footnote, the court cited the Supreme Court's and the Ninth
Circuit's decisions in Rice as implying that the applicability of Mancari has
become more limited since Adarand. With regard to the Supreme Court's
holding, the district court viewed the majority's summary of Mancari as
placing a great emphasis on its applicability being limited to the BIA. With
regard to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Rice, the district court took note of the
footnote that referred to "question[ing] the continued vitality of Mancari" in
Williams.3' The district court also found, however, that the preference could
be "reasonably construed as narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
governmental interest in assisting economically disadvantaged Native-
American enterprises,"'3 thus meeting the requirements of strict scrutiny.
In American Federation of Government Employees, then, the district court
considered the application of strict scrutiny as in Adarand, and found that it
128. 104 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000).
129. Id. at 70-71 n.7.
130. Id. at 71 n.7.
131. Id. (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1081 n.17); see supra note 119.
132. American Federation of Government Employees, 104 F. Supp. at 71.
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would probably hold the preference for "Native-American enterprises"
narrowly tailored enough to withstand strict scrutiny. The district court also
read Rice as supporting the Ninth Circuit's earlier allegations in Williams that
Adarand has changed the scrutiny applicable to racial classifications for
federal purposes relating to Indians.
Another recent case, Harrison v. Department of the Interior," further
clouds the issue of what is a racial criterion and what is a political criterion,
by raising the difficult question of the precise definition of "Indian blood."
Sheron Harrison applied for a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood (CDIB)
from the BIA based on her descent from Cyrus H. Kingsbury, an enrolled
member of the Choctaw Tribe listed on its final membership roll. The
Choctaw Nation and the BIA denied Harrison's request based on the fact that
Kingsbury, though a Tribe member, was a white man who had become a
member by adoption. The BIA and the Choctaw Nation rejected Harrison's
claim that Kingsbury became an Indian by joining the tribe, just as Chief
Justice Taney did Rogers's claim." Harrison appealed to federal district
court, which affirmed the BIA's decision.'35
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that under the
Administrative Procedure Act, it owed no deference to the district court and
could set aside the BINs decision only if it were "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.' '11 The
court offered little explanation as to why it held that the finding that the
descendent of a Tribe member was not an Indian was not arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion. As this case was a summary order and judgment,
the court probably wished to avoid complicated arguments concerning the
legality of considering a tribe member to not be an Indian for some purposes.
My concern is that the disposition of this case confirms the necessity of racial
criteria in American Indian law, in accordance with Simmons v. Eagle
Seelatsee. Under the prevailing mode of thought, which discourages all
consideration of racial characteristics, this case provides additional am-
munition with which proponents of termination can erode away tribal
sovereignty and the trust relationship under the pretence of equal protection.
This particular case goes even beyond the usual assumption that blood
quantum is the ultimate racial criterion; it alludes vaguely to some undefined
whiteness of Kingsbury, that could not be converted into Indian-ness by
joining the Choctaw Nation. How, precisely, can "Indian blood" be defined?
Does it refer to having an ancestor who was a member of a recognized tribe
133. No. 99-7108, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21,962 (10th Cir. Aug. 28, 2000) (order and
judgment), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 665, reh'g denied, 121 S. Ct. 1177 (2000).
134. See supra Part I.B.
135. Harrison, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 21962, at *4.
136. Id. at *6 (citing Mt. Simmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir.
1997)).
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at the time its final rolls were prepared? If so, Harrison carries some quantum
of Indian blood. Does it refer to having an ancestor who was a member of a
tribe (that was later recognized) at the time of first contact with Europeans?
Such a definition of "Indian blood" would be identical to the definition of
"Native Hawaiian" employed by the OHA in Rice. Does it refer to having one
or more recognizable physical characteristics, living in a particular location,
or living by a particular lifestyle? I find it hard to imagine that a reasonable
person would not recognize this final definition as one of the most offensive
ways of defining an already offensive term. That human beings should be
pedigreed to determine if they belong to a group is regrettable, to say the
least; but I find it equally if not more regrettable that they should be deprived
of their land, their culture, and their sovereignty.
The Harrison case seems to implicate the most baldly racist of the
definitions of "Indian blood": that of physical characteristics and lifestyle.
Cyrus Kingsbury was, by any of the suggested definitions of Indian-ness, a
white man at one time. How he came to be a member of the Choctaw Nation
is irrelevant; he was accepted by the Choctaw Nation and by the BIA as
member, and listed on the final roll. The Choctaw Nation and the BIA did not
argue, as the OHA did with regard to Harold Rice, that Kingsbury (or
Harrison) failed to meet a requirement of descending from a person who was
a member at a certain time. Instead, they argued that Kingsbury was "white"
and his membership in the tribe did not confer Indian blood on his descen-
dants. If his descendants do not legally carry Indian blood as a result, it is
because of racial criteria of the most starkly apparent kind.
Conclusion
Another issue is, however, at stake in cases involving tribal membership,
and in every case involving American Indians. Tribes continually experiment
with federal courts, attempting to regain portions of their sovereignty of which
Congress and the courts have chosen to divest them in the past. The Choctaw
Nation, like most other tribes, would ideally prefer, undoubtedly, to determine
its own membership. The conflict between racial criteria and equal protection
could well be avoided in that fashion; if Congress so chose it could permit
tribes to determine their own memberships. Indeed, Congress and the courts
could recognize that tribes are fully sovereign polities, and do away with such
constructs as "quasi-sovereignty," "domestic dependent nations," "aboriginal
title," and "plenary power" to legislate with regard to Indians. Congress could
confine its powers to regulating trade with Indians, the Executive Branch
could confine its powers to treating with tribes, and the courts could confine
their jurisdiction to resolving disputes between U.S. citizens and tribe
members, or between tribes and states, all as clearly provided in the
Constitution.'37 Racial criteria used in determining tribal membership would
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[Congress shall have the power] to regulate commerce ...
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not be subject to the Constitution, as tribes would not be subject to the
Constitution. A basic knowledge of history and a healthy dose of cynicism,
however, lead one to the recognition that the probability of Congress taking
such a normatively commendable step is extremely low.
A less agreeable alternative solution exists to the problem presented by the
continuing use of racial criteria in defining the federal relationship to Indians.
Congress, the courts, and the executive have had their collective eye on this
solution intermittently but inexorably for about the last 225 years. It is the
complete dispossession, assimilation, termination, and divestment of
sovereignty of all American Indian tribes.
The current Court and Congress seem to have no such intention. The
majority in Rice considered Mancari an important and stable enough
precedent, and enough of a threat to their decision against the OHA voting
restriction, to distinguish it from Rice. If the majority wanted to overrule
Mancari, Rice was the wrong situation, but Rice was an ideal situation in
which to weaken Mancari by ignoring it instead of distinguishing it. Three
distinct developments may arise in the future: (1) a differently comprised
Court could overrule Mancari altogether; (2) the Court could explain Mancari
or follow it integrally in a major case, affirming it; or (3) the Court could
partially overrule Mancari, overhauling its principles in some way to better
resist the continuing disassembly of affirmative action and other such
"special" programs.
Lower courts have meanwhile interpreted the situation in many different
ways. The District Court for the District of Columbia stated quite clearly in
American Federation of Government Employees that if it found the Indian
preference racial, it would apply strict scrutiny. The district court interpreted
Adarand as changing Mancari to make strict scrutiny applicable to federal
programs for Indians in at least some cases. Contrarily, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in the Keys case that Jane Doe was an Indian even
though she was not an enrolled member of the Tribe. The court emphasized
that Jane Doe's status as an Indian was due to her recognition by Tribal
authorities as a member, but in the background a blood quantum requirement,
which Jane Doe fulfilled, operated. Thus in Keys the Ninth Circuit followed
Mancari in a way much the same as Fisher v. District Court did: by
disregarding the racial criteria implicit in the federal government's deter-
mination of tribal membership. None of the courts in the cases I have
considered have attacked the use of racial criteria to determine tribal
membership. This lack of questioning of the most widespread use of racial
with the Indian tribes"); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have the power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties"); id. art. III § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power
shall extend to... [clontroversies... between a state, or the [c]itizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects.").
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criteria seems to indicate a tacit distinction between racial criteria used to
determine tribal membership, and racial criteria used for preference programs.
Assuming this distinction between tribal membership and preference
programs, and assuming that it has a clear boundary, I see one other way the
federal government could try to make its programs for Indians consistent with
the ideals of equal protection. The federal government could expurgate all use
of racial criteria except for purposes such as determining tribal membership,
which are so essential as to provide to foundation for the very trust relation-
ship itself. This solution has the unfortunate externality of removing American
Indians who are members of federally unrecognized tribes from the trust
relationship altogether. That result would do nothing to improve the efficiency
and justice of the federal government's administration of its trust relationship
with American Indians, because a tribe's status as federally unrecognized
frequently conveys no substantive information about whether it is actually an
American Indian tribe or not. Indians who do not happen to be members of
federally recognized tribes have a legitimate claim on inclusion in the trust
relationship.'
As many scholars have noted, federal Indian law as a field is contradictory
at best.'39 Specifically,
Tribes are quasi-sovereigns, yet Congress possesses plenary
control over Indian affairs. The government is responsible for
tribal lands and resources, but it can extinguish both at will. The
government asserts that it possesses a political relationship with
federally recognized tribes, yet it maintains relations with a host
of nonrecognized tribes and administers many programs on the
basis of racial criteria.
The government's inability to acknowledge or rectify these
inconsistencies in administering its relationship with American
Indians has led to inequitable treatment among tribes and Indian
peoples, has resulted in the courts continuing divestment of tribal
authority in an era of self-determination, and has placed the
United States in the position of violating evolving international
legal norms of indigenous rights."a
138. See Wayne R. Farnsworth, Bureau of Indian Affairs Hiring Preferences After Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 503, 511 n.38 (1996) ("Native Americans who
consider themselves affiliated with a Tribe, whether or not the Tribe or their membership in the
Tribe is federally recognized, have one definable interest vis-a-vis the federal and state
governments[:] ... to retain some degree of their political autonomy, their cultural identity, and
separateness as peoples.").
139. E.g. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded on Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIz. L. Rsv. 203 (1989).
140. Sharon L. O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain
a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1461, at 1462-1463.
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As Professor Sharon O'Brien noted, the United States government created this
contradictory mess of statutes, court decisions, and regulations for itself, and
all too frequently Indians and tribes are the losers when courts try to
harmonize inconsistencies in federal policies relating to them. As regards the
conflict between racial criteria in federal Indian law and equal protection, if
the federal government wants to have its federal Indian law cake and eat it
too, it must somehow eradicate the use of racial criteria in most areas. Courts
may not continue to support racial criteria for purposes other than tribal
membership; they may not continue to support racial criteria for tribal
membership purposes, either. Removing all use of racial criteria from federal
Indian laws not related to tribal membership would exclude members of
unrecognized tribes, and individual Indians who are not members of tribes,
from the trust relationship. Complete termination would be even more
disastrous for Indians nationwide, but termination is, fortunately, an unpopular
solution to the problem of federal Indian law; gradual assimilation probably
enjoys more widespread support among non-Indians. Be the underlying
strategy termination or assimilation, the end result is the same. The federal
government has a more ethical alternative - one that it claims to be working
for.'4' The placement of Morton v. Mancari within the overarching federal
relationship to Indians after the Adarand, Williams, and Rice decisions will be
worked out by the courts in the years to come. I can only hope that the
Supreme Court will retain or reacquire enough of its former liberal character
to uphold the exemplary ideals expressed in the Indian Self-Determination
Act:
The prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has
served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people
and their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity
to develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-
government, and has denied to the Indian people an effective
voice in the planning and implementation of programs for the
benefit of Indians which are responsive to the true needs of Indian
communities.'
141. E.g. Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 2, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203
(1975), 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994).
142. Id.
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